Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the words of my two

colleagues and the introduction of Ambassador Sherman. However,

I will defer my comments prefering first to hear from our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Sherman, I want to express my sincere appreciation

to you, to Secretary Perry, to Ambassador Kartman, and to all of

the assistants and support people you have, in focusing on these

important North Korean issues for us. I wish you well, and I hope

you will convey that to them.

Ambassador, Secretary Albright, within the last

month, has answered questions before the Committee, including

one I addressed to her. I asked her if the resumption of missile

flight tests of the Taepo Dong II would signify a decision by the

DPRK to follow the path of confrontation, the second of the two

paths that Secretary Perry has put before them.

Do you agree with her view? Do you know whether or not Secretary

Perry would agree with that view?

Do you think it would suggest that they have decided

to take the path of confrontation or to continue on it perhaps?

The second path is basically to prepare our capacities

to deal with a continued or a more militant North Korea,

as I understand it.

It is not a matter of war or——

Ambassador, on February 15th of this year, a

memorandum was sent to the Committee which conveyed a memorandum

of justification about the certifications and intent to waive

certifications required under various statutes to continue our participation

in KEDO.

On page 3 of that unclassified memorandum, it says, specifically,

that North Korea’s agreement to freeze and eventually dismantle

its declared graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities

at Yongbyon and Taechon has halted activities that, had they

not been stopped, would have given the DPRK a nuclear weapons

capability.

My question is: Is this suggesting that North Korea does not

have a nuclear weapons capacity, or is it suggesting that the

Agreed Framework has halted the North Korean nuclear weapons

development program? Which is it?

Then I think that is a misleading statement in

that memorandum because it does say that the agreement has

stopped what would have given the DPRK a nuclear weapons capability.

It appears to me that you are not saying North Korea does

not have a nuclear weapons capability right now.

It is just that the nuclear weapons development program and the

judgment behind the certification has been stopped. However, the

capacity may be there now. At least——

But they are not saying they don’t have one now.

Right. OK.

Thank you.

Ambassador, this would seem like a question that should have

been asked a long time ago, but maybe it has and I am not aware

of it being asked or the answer to it. Has the Department of Energy,

or any Federal agency, made preliminary decisions regarding

the licensing of nuclear reactors or nuclear technology to North

Korea?

Has Secretary Richardson or his predecessor, Secretary O’Leary,

made any commitments regarding the expedited licensing of nuclear

technology that eventually would reach the DPRK? It goes to

what safeguards would have been put in place or which would still

need to be put in place. Are you aware of the answer to those questions?

But it is——

Because those are U.S.-licensed technologies——

[continuing]. That would be put in place through

the South Korean entity, through the KEDO entity, I believe.

So you would expect or convey to the Department

of Energy that they need to be in consultation with Congress to assure

that the safeguards that they need to negotiate yet would

meet statutory requirements?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

Thank you, Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Both the Chairman and I are interested in whether the North

Koreans have agreed to dates certain for talks on missiles. I would

also ask a second question. Since North Korea is the world’s worst

proliferator when it comes to missile technology, and since non-U.S.

independent sources indicate that North Koreans are working on

nuclear development programs elsewhere in Asia, to what extent

are we making that an element in our talks with them to try to

get a commitment that they are going to abandon this kind of third

country work on missile development and nuclear development?

I just want to know if it is being taken into account—

third country.

Thank you.